Bay, to some extent by Neander and other eminent divines, who have of late years been defending their system against another supported by the followers of Hegel, which professes to be more rational and logical. In doing so, it should be acknowledged that they have furnished very able defences and beautiful exhibitions of some of the essential truths of Christianity. But, as the practical result of the whole, the scepticism which began with the universities and the clergy has now gone down to the common people, and has assumed, at least in the cities, a form sufficiently vulgar and offensive ; and the followers of Schleierrnacher find that they have no power to allay the spirit which has been called up, for the dreamy intuitions of the divines are felt to be as incapable of being grasped by the practical understanding of the common people, as they are acknowledged to be incapable of being apprehended by the logical understanding of the philosophers. Yet this is the system which is being imported into our country by certain clergymen of the Anglican Establishment and Congregational ministers in England. In particular, Mr. Morell, after mixing with it a farther medley from the eclectic philosophy of Cousin, is seeking to recommend it to the British public. Our limits do not admit of our exposing its errors, but we are tempted to point out the fallacies to be found in some of its principles.

1st, We insist that no intuition be admitted in philosophic or religious speculation, till it is proved by induction to be in the constitution of the mind—nay, till its nature and rule be pointed out. *Crede ut intelligas* was the maxim of Anselm, and the counterpart maxim of Abelard, *intelli/e ut credos.* Both maxiuiH are true, and the one limits the other. We acknowledge that there are intuitions in the human mind, and that, without them, the understanding, having no basis, could erect no superstructure. The whole would be like multiplying nothing by nothing—the result would still be nothing. But then we are not entitled in any speculation to proceed on an alleged intuition, till it has been shown to be. **an** intuition. Nor can an appeal on this subject be made to the conscinusm'.ss, for w<» are not immediately conscious of an intuition. We can be conscious only of tho working of an intuition, and he who would determine whnt the intuition i», snn.st by induction ascertain its law. The intuition, it is true, acts rjinntnncouKty in the mind, whether we observe it or not—nay, it must first act In- fore 'we can observe it; but then, the previous observation is ncces-vary, in order to our assuming this intuition in philosophic investigation. The intuitions net according to fixed principles, and these are the true principles of metaphysical philosophy; but we are not directly cognizant of them as general principles, and we cannot use them in science, till we have specified their precise nature. By no proems of induction can we demonstrate the truth of fundamental principles, but it is only by a process of induction that we can find out what they are, and make a scientific use of them.* If we neglect to do so, we may find our.st-lve.s nturtmg

with error, and so can never arrive at truth, and the mind would ever Imve to

* We are prepared to defend the following propositions in regard to lunaU: id'-as* or <'<uHt!uiUnnal principles of the mind:—T. Negatively, that then.; arc no innate Mean in f.lu.; n.iiid, ti.j a* Inmg.-K or mental representations; nor, (2.) as abstract or general notioiiH; nor, (3.) an priudph-H ti thought, belief, or action, before the consciousness, as principles But II. Positively, (l.; that f hem are con-stitutional principles operating in the mind, though riot before the cowrf oww-•», tin j'.airnil principle; (2.) that these come forth into consciousness as individual {notgewwD ri^nitsmiHorjudi'immnjaiK!,

{3.) that these individual exercises, when carefully inducted—-hut only Il h«.:n «»~ i'ivo u« primitive *»r philosophic truths. It follows that, while these native principles opcratr- In the mind ni-oMtniKjourty, we are entitled to uso them reflcxly, in philoflophic or thwlcj'h; «p!.:tilutl«i», only nfti-r ht?w determined their nature by abstraction ami tf.aicraliHati<w. (See I IM'UTKATI VH NOTK K, pp. 28 »nd APPENDIX vi.)